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Abstract
We present a data-driven framework called gen-
erative adversarial privacy (GAP). Inspired by
recent advancements in generative adversarial net-
works (GANs), GAP allows the data holder to
learn the privatization mechanism directly from
the data. Under GAP, finding the optimal pri-
vacy mechanism is formulated as a constrained
minimax game between a privatizer and an ad-
versary. We show that for appropriately chosen
adversarial loss functions, GAP provides privacy
guarantees against strong information-theoretic
adversaries. We also evaluate GAP’s performance
on the GENKI face database.
1. Introduction
The use of machine learning algorithms for data analytics
has recently seen unprecedented success for a variety of
problems of practical relevance such as image classification,
natural language processing, and prediction of consumer be-
havior, electricity use, political preferences, to name a few.
The success of these algorithms hinges on the availability of
large datasets, which are often crowd-sourced and contain
private information. This, in turn, has led to privacy con-
cerns and a growing body of research focused on developing
privacy-guaranteed learning techniques.
Moving towards randomization-based methods, in recent
years, two distinct approaches with provable statistical pri-
vacy guarantees have emerged: (a) context-free approaches
that assume worst-case dataset statistics and adversaries; (b)
context-aware approaches that explicitly model the dataset
statistics and adversary’s capabilities. On the one hand,
context-free approaches (such as differential privacy (Dwork
& Roth, 2014)) provide strong privacy guarantees against
worst-case adversaries, but often lead to a significant reduc-
tion in the utility and increased sample complexity (Fienberg
et al., 2010; Wang et al., 2015; Yu et al., 2014; Karwa &
Slavkovic´, 2016; Duchi et al., 2016; Kairouz et al., 2016).
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On the other, context-aware approaches (such as mutual
information privacy (Rebollo-Monedero et al., 2010; Cal-
mon & Fawaz, 2012; Sankar et al., 2013)) achieve a better
privacy-utility tradeoff by incorporating the statistics of the
dataset and explicitly modeling the public and private vari-
ables, but necessitate knowledge of data statistics (such as
joint priors over the public and private variables). Such
information is hardly ever present in practice.
Given the challenges of existing approaches, we take a fun-
damentally new approach towards enabling private data
publishing. Instead of adopting worst-case, context-free
notions of data privacy, we introduce a novel context-aware
model of privacy that allows the designer to cleverly add
noise where it matters. We overcome the issue of statistical
knowledge by taking a data-driven approach; specifically,
we leverage recent advancements in generative adversar-
ial networks (GANs) (Goodfellow et al., 2014; Mirza &
Osindero, 2014) to introduce a framework for context-aware
privacy that we call generative adversarial privacy (GAP).
2. Generative Adversarial Privacy
We consider a dataset D which contains both public and
private variables for n individuals. We represent the public
variables by a random variable X , and the private variables
(which are typically correlated with the public variables)
by a random variable Y . Each dataset entry contains a
pair of public and private variables denoted by (X,Y ). We
assume that each entry pair (X,Y ) is distributed according
to P (X,Y ), and is independent from other entry pairs in the
dataset. We define the privacy mechanism as a randomized
mapping given by Xˆ = g(X,Y ).
We define Yˆ = h(g(X,Y )) to be the adversary’s inference
of the private variable Y from Xˆ using a decision rule h.
We allow for hard decision rules under which h(g(X,Y ))
is a direct estimate of Y and soft decision rules under which
h(g(X,Y )) = Ph(·|g(X,Y )) is a distribution over Y . To
quantify the adversary’s performance, we use a loss function
`(h(g(X = x)), Y = y) defined for every public-private
pair (x, y). Thus, the expected loss of the adversary with
respect to (w.r.t.) X and Y is
L(h, g) , E[`(h(g(X,Y )), Y )], (1)
where the expectation is taken over P (X,Y ) and the ran-
domness in g and h.
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The data holder would like to find a privacy mechanism g
that is both privacy preserving (in the sense that it is difficult
for the adversary to learn Y from Xˆ) and utility preserving
(in the sense that it does not distort the original data too
much). In contrast, for a fixed choice of privacy mechanism
g, the adversary would like to find a (potentially random-
ized) function h that minimizes its expected loss, which
is equivalent to maximizing the negative of the expected
loss. This leads to a constrained minimax game between the
privatizer and the adversary given by
min
g(·)
max
h(·)
− L(h, g) (2)
s.t. E[d(g(X,Y ), X)] ≤ D,
where the constant D ≥ 0 determines the allowable dis-
tortion for the privatizer and the expectation is taken over
P (X,Y ) and the randomness in g and h.
Theorem 1. Under the class of hard decision rules, when
`(h(g(x, y), y)) is the 0-1 loss function, the GAP minimax
problem in (2) simplifies to
min
g(·)
max
y∈Y
P (y, g(X,Y )) (3)
s.t. E[d(g(X,Y ), X)] ≤ D,
indicating that maximizing the probability of correctly guess-
ing Y is the optimal adversarial strategy for any privatizer,
i.e., the adversary uses the MAP decision rule. On the
other hand, for a soft-decision decoding adversary (i.e.,
h = Ph(y|xˆ) is a distribution over Y) under log-loss func-
tion `(h(g(X,Y )), y) = log 1Ph(y|g(X,Y )) , the optimal ad-
versarial strategy h∗ is the posterior belief of Y given
g(X,Y ) and the GAP minimax problem in (2) is equiva-
lent to
min
g(·)
I(g(X,Y );Y ) (4)
s.t. E[d(g(X,Y ), X)] ≤ D,
where I(g(X,Y );Y ) is the mutual information (MI) be-
tween g(X,Y ) and Y .
The above theorem shows that GAP can can recover MI
privacy (under a log loss) and MAP privacy (under a 0-1
loss). The proof of Theorem 1 is omitted for brevity.
2.1. Data-driven GAP
In the absence of P (X,Y ), we propose a data-driven ver-
sion of GAP that allows the data holder to learn privatization
mechanisms directly from a dataset D = {(x(i), y(i))}ni=1.
Under the data-driven version of GAP, we represent the
privacy mechanism via a generative model g(X,Y ; θp) pa-
rameterized by θp. In the training phase, the data holder
learns the optimal parameters θp by competing against a
computational adversary: a classifier modeled by a neural
network h(g(X,Y ; θp); θa) parameterized by θa.
In the data-driven approach, we can quantify the adversary’s
(X,Y )
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Figure 1: A multi-layer neural network model for the priva-
tizer and adversary
empirical loss by
Ln(θp, θa) =− 1
n
n∑
i=1
`(h(g(x(i), y(i); θp); θa), y(i)) (5)
where (x(i), y(i)) is the ith row of D. The optimal parame-
ters for the privatizer and adversary are the solutions to
min
θp
max
θa
− Ln(θp, θa) (6)
s.t. ED[d(g(X,Y ; θp), X)] ≤ D,
where the expectation is over D and the randomness in g.
3. GAP for the GENKI Dataset
To demonstrate GAP’s capability of learning the privacy
mechanism directly from the data, we test our model on
the GENKI dataset (Whitehill & Movellan, 2012) which
contains 1940 grey-scale images of faces. We consider
gender as private variable Y and the image pixels as pub-
lic variable X . Two different privatizer architectures are
studied: the feedforward neural network privatizer (FNNP)
and the transposed convolutional neural network privatizer
(TCNNP). The FNNP uses a five-layer feedforward neural
network to combine the low-dimensional noise with the
original image. The TCNNP uses a three-layer transposed
convolutional neural network to generate high-dimensional
additive noise from low-dimensional noise. The adversary
is modeled by a seven-layer convolutional neural network.
Figure 2 illustrates the gender classification accuracy of the
adversary for different values of distortion. We observe
that the adversary’s accuracy of classifying the private label
(gender) decreases progressively as the distortion increases.
Given the same distortion value, FNNP achieves better pri-
vacy protection compared with TCNNP. The adversary’s
miss-classified privatized image samples are shown in Fig-
ure 3. We observe that both privatizers change mostly eyes,
nose, mouth, beard, and hair.
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